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Abstract
In two studies, we examine how objective complexity—in terms of numbers of negotiable issues—affects negotiators’ aspirations, perceptions, actions, and ultimately, the quality of agreements they reach. We hypothesized and found that when negotiators had a greater number of issues to resolve, they were less ambitious for their own outcomes and developed less accurate insights into their partners’ interests. 


When less is more: How complexity impacts goal setting, judgement accuracy, and 
deals in negotiation. 

Introduction
Given the potential for exchanging concessions, a two-issue negotiation offers greater opportunity for a negotiator to do well than does a single-issue negotiation (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). Recognizing this, a purchasing manager, for instance, might decide to add a few more items to her order to give herself and the supplier more room to exchange concessions. Indeed, adding issues or being flexible on terms may open up opportunities for profitable trades to be made in integrative negotiation. Adding elements, however, also drives up the complexity of the negotiation (Chernev, Bockenholt, & Goodman, 2015; Schaerer, Loschelder, & Swaab, 2016), and whether the added complexity is worth the possible benefits that flow from a larger set of negotiable issues is an open question.
In his classic writing, Raiffa (1982) highlighted the number of issues to be negotiated as well as other dimensions (e.g., number of parties, time constraints, repeated versus one-off negotiations) in his discussion of negotiation complexity (see also, Crump, 2015; Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Watkins, 2003).  Surprisingly, although complexity is common in negotiation (Watkins, 1999), very little empirical work has examined the impact of complexity on negotiation performance.  For instance, only a handful of studies have investigated the workings of multi-party negotiations (see Bottom, 2003; Gray, 2011; McCusker & Carnevale, 1995; Swaab, Kern, Diermeier, & Medvec, 2009; Querou, Rio, & Tidball, 2007; Traavik, 2011; Van Beest, Van Kleef, & Van Dijik, 2008). An even smaller number has explored how the number of issues impacts negotiation. What work has been done reveals a noteworthy pattern for subjective and objective outcomes. Negotiators who must resolve a greater number of issues are relatively less satisfied with their experience (Naquin, 2003). When it comes to deal quality, a greater number of issues can be an advantage, as one might hypothesize, but only for negotiators who were accountable for their process (Van der Schalk, Beersma, Van Kleef, & De Dreu, 2010). While the pattern of better outcomes and higher dissatisfaction is provocative, these results must be carefully considered. In both sets of studies, the lower and higher complexity conditions were not identical; more complex negotiations also carried greater potential for profits relative to the lower complexity condition, making it more difficult to draw strong conclusions about the specific effects of complexity.
The purpose of the present study is to provide a more complete and precise view of the way in which the number of issues to be negotiated affects negotiation processes and outcomes.  More specifically, we examine whether and how objective complexity—in the form of number of negotiable issues—affects bargainers’ ambitions, perceptions and outcomes.  We do so by drawing upon research in the motivation and decision-making literature (e.g., Campbell, 1988) and propose both a motivational and a cognitive pathway through which complexity impacts negotiation performance.
We aim to make three contributions. First, we extend previous research in the motivation and decision-making literatures on task complexity to the negotiation literature. Second, we show the mechanisms through which negotiation complexity influences outcomes. Finally, we add to the negotiation literature by showing how including more issues—even integrative issues—can have potential costs at the bargaining table.  
Complexity in the Motivation and Decision-making Literatures
Although there has been scant research on complexity in negotiation, this is not the case in the
allied areas of goal setting and decision-making (see Campbell, 1988; Wood, 1986 for reviews). Research offers a number of well-accepted definitions and strong frameworks for complexity (see Campbell, 1988; Haerem, Pentland, & Miller, 2015; Liu & Li, 2012). For example, Wood (1986) proposed three dimensions of objective complexity: tasks can have component complexity, coordinative complexity, and dynamic complexity. Component complexity refers to the “number of distinct acts that need to be executed in the performance of a task and the number of distinct information cues that must be processed in the performance of those acts” (p. 66). Coordinative complexity describes the interrelationship and sequencing of information cues, acts, and products. Finally, dynamic complexity refers to changes outside the task that can affect the relation between task inputs and outcomes. What is important about these types of complexity for our purposes is that as a negotiation task becomes more complex, involving a greater number of issues, parties, and shifting alternatives, all three dimensions of complexity are at play.
Research in the motivation and decision-making literature shows that complexity undermines motivation and interferes with cognition.  For instance, Campbell’s (1988) theoretical framework of task complexity suggests that, complexity influences both goals (motivation) and strategy planning and development (cognition) with increased complexity demotivating participants. College students, for example, set lower goals for their own grades in classes they saw as more complex and difficult relative to courses they considered easier (Horvath, Herleman, & McKie, 2006). However, the results changed when students were motivated to improve their abilities (motivational goal orientation) and demonstrate their competence (performance-approach goal orientation). Decision-making research also identifies a negative impact of complexity on cognition, particularly when it comes to planning (Paquette & Kids, 1988; Payne, 1976). When tasks are complex, individuals are likely to choose simpler search strategies, to search less deeply for information, and to focus on less accurate information compared to when tasks are simpler (Gupta, Li, & Sharda, 2013; Lejarraga, 2010; Swait & Adamowicz, 2001; Timmermans, 1993).
Extending this work, in the following sections, we propose that negotiation component complexity—in the form of number of negotiable issues—will reduce negotiators’ motivation (goal setting) and interfere with their cognition (judgement accuracy), and ultimately, undermine the quality of agreements reached. 
Goal Setting in Negotiation
Over the years, the finding of a strong positive impact of negotiators’ goals on deal quality has proven robust (Miles & Clenney, 2012; Neale & Bazerman, 1985; Zetik & Stuhlmacher, 2002). Even when goals are so ambitious that negotiators cannot reach them, these impossible goals also produce better negotiation outcomes (Miles & Clenney, 2012).  Although there are differences between the effectiveness of goal setting for simple versus complex tasks as a function of goal orientation (Seijts, Latham, Tasa, & Latham, 2004; Tasa, Celani, & Bell, 2013), high goals and high aspirations have been found to have a positive impact on negotiation performance in a variety of tasks ranging from simple to complex (Miles & Clenney, 2012; Thompson, 1990; Zetik & Stuhlmacher, 2002).  
We expect, consistent with the expectancy-valence framework (Vroom, 1964), as the objective complexity of a negotiation grows (i.e., component complexity), through the addition of more issues to the negotiation, individuals’ expectancy beliefs are likely to drop (Campbell, 1982), leading them to set less ambitious goals for themselves (see Horvath et al., 2006). Thus, we hypothesize that when faced with a more complex negotiation, bargainers will set lower goals (H1) relative to those who anticipate a less complex negotiation. Because lower goals translate into lower value deals (Zetik & Stuhlmacher, 2002), we predict lower outcomes among those in the high complexity condition relative to those in the low complexity condition (H2).  Finally, we predict that goals (H3) will mediate the impact of complexity on deals, allowing us to specify one of the mechanisms through which complexity operates.
Judgement Accuracy in Negotiation
Viewing negotiation as a game of information, scholars commonly suggest that bargainers gather as much information as they can (e.g., Fisher et al., 1991; Walton & McKersie, 1965). The thinking goes that the more a negotiator knows about her own as well as the other side’s interests, constraints, and outside options, the better able she is to craft a deal that can meet both sides’ interests (see Lewicki, Hiam, & Olander, 1996; Malhotra & Bazerman, 2007; Neale & Bazerman, 1991). Particularly in multi-issue negotiations, such as integrative negotiations (Lax & Sebenius, 1986), where parties can exchange concessions (Fisher et al., 1991; Tajima & Fraser, 2001; Thompson, 2001), understanding the other side’s interests and priorities pay off (Bazerman & Carroll, 1987; Kim, Cundiff, & Choi, 2015; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; Thompson & Hastie, 1990; Walton & McKersie, 1965; Wening, Keith, & Abele, 2015).
Even the simplest negotiation can be cognitively taxing when one considers all that goes into formulating offers, comparing incoming offers to alternatives, and trying to uncover and understand the other side’s needs and interests. In fact, a wide variety of studies attests to just how difficult it is for negotiators to gain an accurate understanding of each other’s needs and priorities. Too much stress (O’Connor, Arnold, & Maurizio, 2010), too many parties at the table (Traavik, 2011), nondiagnostic information (Wiltermuth & Neale, 2011) and the communication and perceptual challenges that arise from intercultural negotiations (Adair, Brett, Lempereur, Okumura, Shikhirev, Tinsley, & Lytle,  2004) all conspire to overload negotiators, interfering with their ability to accurately code one another’s needs and priorities.
Of course, as tasks move from relatively simple (e.g., few independent subparts) to more complex (e.g., several conflicting subparts), so, too, do the cognitive demands placed on one’s knowledge, skills, and resources grow (Campbell & Gingrich, 1986; Naylor & Dickinson, 1969; Wood, 1986). To expand from a small set of negotiable issues to double that number is likely to increase the cognitive demands on negotiators. Thus, we hypothesize that the cognitive burdens that accompany an increased number of issues will undermine negotiator judgement accuracy in much the same way as other pressures do; specifically, negotiators in the higher complexity condition will report relatively lower judgement accuracy (H4). We will test this causal link by hypothesizing that accuracy will mediate the hypothesized negative effect of complexity on the quality of deals (H5).
STUDY 1
Method
Participants
312 undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory management course participated for course credit. One hundred and fifty (55%) were male.  Many of these participants were part-time students with job experience and this is reflected in their demographics; their average age was 23.1 years (SD = 4.4).  The average number of years of full-time work experience was 1.6 (SD = 7.1), and part-time work experience was 3.7 (SD = 2.4). Students had not completed a negotiation course, and can be considered novices.
Procedure
Participants received background material describing their roles, the situation, and the issues to be negotiated. Each participant was randomly assigned to negotiate as an agent for a group of students in an advanced business course with one agent negotiating for students with a technology and innovation focus and the other representing students with an interest in entrepreneurship. They were paired at random and then they negotiated issues related to a class trip and project (O’Connor & Arnold, 2011). Participants received a payoff schedule that presented the issues to be negotiated, the potential settlement levels for each issue, and the points associated with settlement at each level (see Appendices A and B).  
We randomly assigned participants to one of two complexity conditions. In the Lower Complexity condition (LC), the negotiation involved three issues: number of sites to be visited, mix of businesses, and assignment. Assignment was a distributive issue, whereas the number of sites and mix of businesses were integrative issues that enabled tradeoffs. In the Higher Complexity condition (HC), the negotiation involved seven issues: the three original issues plus the location of the sites, budget, timing of trip, and assignment due date. Budget and timing were the additional distributive issues and location and assignment due date were the additional integrative issues.  As can be seen from the payoff charts (see Appendices A and B), in both the HC and LC condition, if a negotiator were to claim the maximum number of points on each issue, he/she would receive 1300 points. The value of a ‘split-the-difference’ deal was 650 points.  The value of the integrative deal--‘split-the-difference’ on distributive issues and fully logrolled outcomes on the integrative issues—was 1000 points. 
Measures
A pre-task questionnaire included manipulation checks and a measure of ambitions. Goals were measured by the item: “How many points do you hope to receive in the upcoming negotiation (what is your goal)?” (Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994).  Participants had 20 minutes to read about the negotiation task and complete the pre-task questionnaire.  After participants completed the pre-task questionnaire, they had 30 minutes to negotiate.
Following the negotiation, participants completed a second questionnaire. To measure the impact of complexity on judgement accuracy, participants filled in the associated points as they believed the points appeared on their counterparts’ payoff schedule on a blank sheet (see Liu, Liu, & Zhang, 2016; Pietroni, Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Pagliaro, 2008; Thompson & Hastie, 1990). The absolute value of the difference between the participants’ estimates and true values was the measure of judgement accuracy with greater scores indicating lower accuracy. Finally, we summed the points that each party received for each of the issues (three or seven) to create an individual outcome score.  As noted above, because the point systems for the HC and LC conditions are compatible (see Appendices A and B), it is possible to directly compare goals, judgement accuracy, and outcomes when testing our hypotheses. 
Analytic strategy 
For measures collected before negotiations begin, it is appropriate to conduct analyses at the individual level. However, once negotiations start, partners become interdependent as their choice of tactics and their outcomes are responsive to what the other has done. These data interdependencies create several analytical challenges (Kenny, 1996a and Kenny, 1996b; see also Turel, 2010). Ignoring these characteristics of the data can affect tests of significance (by producing biased standard errors) and lead to incorrect inferences (Kenny & Judd, 1986; 1996).
Dyads are a special case of hierarchically structured data, with individual negotiators nested within dyads. Multilevel models can be used to account for the interdependence between members of dyads.  Such models are a set of regression estimation techniques applied to data organized into hierarchically structured clusters (Bryk & Raudenbusch, 2002; Snijders & Bosker, 1999). Multilevel analysis combines the effects of variables at different levels (individual and dyadic) into a single model, while accounting for the interdependence among observations within higher-level units.  In this paper, we used a multilevel random intercept regression model (using STATA’s xtreg command).
Results
Eight dyads (5%) failed to reach an agreement in the negotiation. Subsequent analyses do not include dyads who reached an impasse. Table 1 shows the means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations among the study variables.
In the LC condition, 97% (147/152) correctly identified that their negotiation involved three issues. In the HC condition, 88% (127/144), correctly identified that their negotiation involved seven issues, giving us confidence in our manipulation of objective complexity (for a discussion of objective and subjective objectivity, see Campbell 1988; Chan, Song, & Yao, 2015; Maynard & Hakel, 1977).  
Because we were interested in the influence of complexity on negotiation outcomes and not time pressure (e.g., De Dreu, 2003), we chose a 30 minute time interval for the negotiation.  This interval based upon an eight issue recruiter-candidate negotiation task commonly used in research. LC participants negotiated for an average of 15 minutes compared to those in the HC condition who negotiated for an average of 19 minutes.  Thus, parties in both conditions appeared to have ample time to negotiate.
Finally, given that complexity may influence the degree to which negotiators were committed to their goals (Seijts, Latham, Tasa, & Latham, 2004), and, thus how much effort they were willing to exert toward meeting their goals (Winters & Latham, 1996), we also measured their level of goal commitment using the Hollenbeck, Williams, & Klein (HWK) scale (1989).  Following the recommendations of Klein, Wesson, Hollenbeck, Wright, & DeShon (1991), we used a five item version of the scale (α = .68).  There were no significant differences between the HC and LC conditions for goal commitment, F(1, 290) = .73, ns.
As we predicted (H1), complexity reduced negotiators’ ambitions for themselves.  HC participants set significantly lower goals (M = 806, SD = 279) than did LC participants (M = 920, SD = 261), coefficient = -113.8, SE = 32.58, z = -3.49, p = .0001.  When it came to negotiation outcomes (H2), complexity also had a negative impact, as we hypothesized.  HC negotiators reached deals of relatively lower value (M = 737, SD = 166) than did LC negotiators (M = 789, SD = 174), coefficient = -51.4, SE = 22.31, z = -2.30, p = .02).  In H3 we predicted that goals would mediate the impact of complexity on deals.  Following the guidelines of Baron and Kenny (1986), having established the links between complexity and outcomes, and complexity and goals, we tested and found a positive relation between goals and outcomes (coefficient = .10, SE = .036, z = 2.79, p = .005).  When both complexity and goals were entered into the regression equation, economic ambitions remained significant (coefficient = .09, SE = .04, z = 2.42, p = .02), and complexity was no longer significant (coefficient = -44.3, SE = 23.19, z = -1.91, p = .06), indicating full mediation.
	We also hypothesized that higher complexity would diminish negotiators’ judgement accuracy (H4). This was the case; judgement inaccuracy was significantly higher in the HC (M = 3459, SD = 857) than in the LC condition (M = 2984, SD = 1247), coefficient = 469.59, SE = 156.15, z = 3.01, p = .003.  In H5, we predicted that judgement accuracy would mediate the effect of complexity on negotiation outcomes.  Having established the links between complexity and outcomes, and complexity and judgement accuracy, we tested and found a negative relation between judgement accuracy (inaccuracy) and outcomes (coefficient = -.05, SE = .009, z = -5.99, p = .0001).  When both complexity and judgement accuracy were entered into the regression equation, judgement accuracy remained significant (coefficient = -.05, SE = .009, z = -5.61, p = .0001), and complexity was no longer significant (coefficient = -26.26, SE = 21.24, z = -1.24, p = .22), indicating full mediation.
Discussion
A greater number of issues can provide greater opportunities for negotiators to make beneficial trades in integrative negotiation, but too much of a good thing seems to be too much for negotiators.  When looking at the value of deals agreed, the greater the number of negotiable issues, the worse the negotiators did. And our mediation results show how complexity operates. The prospect of a more objectively complex negotiation led bargainers to scale back their aspirations. These reduced aspirations help explain the drop in deal quality; so, too, does judgement (in)accuracy. A greater number of negotiable issues interfered with bargainers’ ability to fully and accurately understand their counterparts’ preferences and needs as the negotiation unfolded. In addition to the negative effect of lowered goals, the cognitive burden of greater complexity also sabotaged deal quality. Adding just a handful of extra issues significantly shaped negotiators’ paths and determined their outcomes.
Study 2
Given the dynamic and interactive nature of negotiation, it is likely that more than one dimension of objective task complexity (i.e., component and coordinative) was involved in Study 1.  In order to provide a more precise and rigorous test of how more issues might impact negotiation, we focus exclusively on component complexity in Study 2.  More specifically, we examine whether component complexity impacts the pre-negotiation aspirations of negotiators.  
In addition to providing a clearer test of component complexity, the purpose of Study 2 was to address a limitation regarding the sample used in Study 1. Although the participants were older and had more full-time and part-time work experience than the typical undergraduate, the findings may have been a function of their age.  It is possible that older and more experienced participants would be less impacted when facing a more complex negotiation than younger and less experienced participants.  As a result, these negotiators may be less likely to lower their goals or aspirations when facing a complex negotiation. Consistent with the expectancy-valence framework (Vroom, 1964) and the results of Study 1, we expect that complexity will be associated with lower self-set goals for negotiators.
Method
Participants
We recruited 130 participants from MTurk, and our draw was limited to the United States.  57% were male.  Participants’ ages ranged from 18-63 years, with an average age of 31.6 years (SD = 9.5). 
Procedure
Participants were told to imagine they were negotiating with a home owner whose home they were interested in renting for the holidays.  We randomly assigned participants to one of two complexity conditions.  In the Low Complexity condition (LC), participants were told they would be negotiating over three issues related to renting the house (daily rate, move-in date, length of rental),  In the High Complexity (LC) condition, participants were told they would be negotiating over seven issues related to renting the house.  In addition to daily rate, move-in date, length of rental, they were also negotiating over the security deposit, cleaning fee, use of equipment, and pet deposit (see Appendix C).  Participants were instructed to, “Try to get the best deal for yourself and that means an agreement that gives you the highest number of points.”  Similar to Study 1, because the points systems are compatible between the HC and LC conditions (see Appendix C), it is possible to directly compare goals when testing our hypothesis.
Measures
A pre-task questionnaire included manipulation checks and a measure of ambitions. Goals were measured by asking participants to enter, “How many points do you hope to get in this negotiation (what is your goal)?” (Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994).  
Results
In the LC condition, 97% (66/68) correctly identified that their negotiation involved three issues. In the HC condition, 87% (54/62), correctly identified that their negotiation involved seven issues, giving us confidence in our manipulation of objective complexity.  There were no significant differences between the HC and LC conditions regarding to likely participants reported to be willing to persist to reach a good deal, F(1, 128) = .58, ns.
Consistent with Study 1, as we predicted, complexity reduced negotiators’ ambitions for themselves.  Participants in the HC condition (M = 1037.83, SD = 278.43) set significantly lower goals than did participants in the LC condition (M = 1135.98, SD = 219.88), F(1, 124) = 4.87, p = .03.
General Discussion
Adding issues to a negotiation increases opportunities for making the kinds of tradeoffs that can facilitate a deal, as any negotiation scholar will tell you. In two studies, we examined one of the consequences of this strategy in negotiation: increased complexity.  In Study 1, we found that this practice makes the negotiation more complex and in ways that could potentially sabotage the value of deals.  A test of possible explanations showed why this was the case. Complexity led negotiators to scale back their ambitions, reducing their expectations for their outcomes. A greater number of issues also prevented negotiators from developing accurate perceptions of their counterparts’ interests and priorities, suggesting a cognitive cost to complexity.  Given these motivational and cognitive effects, it was not at all surprising that complexity led to relatively lower value deals. In Study 2, we found that component complexity, depressed negotiators’ aspirations with an older and more experienced participants.  
Implications
Over a decade ago, scholars highlighted the importance of treating negotiation complexity as an independent variable and examining how complexity impacts negotiation (Crump, 2003).  Although complexity is the rule rather than the exception in negotiation (Watkins, 1999), few studies have explored its effects. Yet, understanding the effects of the complexity that negotiators face at the table can help us understand the limits to current theories as well as sharpen our practical advice to bargainers.
In addition to documenting complexity’s effects here, we sought to gain insight into how complexity operates and affects negotiators. Studies in the goal setting and decision-making literatures offered a starting point, showing that complexity drives down performance by undercutting motivation (Campbell, 1982; Horvath et al., 2006) and by interfering with cognition, especially when it comes to planning (Paquette & Kids, 1988; Payne, 1976). We identified similar results, extending support for complexity’s effects to interpersonal mixed-motive task settings.
From a practical perspective, one may be tempted to add additional issues to a negotiation to provide one with more options for profitable trades. While the benefits of this approach are clear, it comes with a potential cost.  
Limitations and Future Research
What may distinguish novices from expert negotiators is their ability to handle complexity at the table. Subsequent investigations could go further to note what kinds of negotiators are particularly vulnerable to the effects of complexity and who is buffered from its impact.
	These studies examined whether and how objective complexity–in the form of the number of negotiable issues–impacted negotiation performance.  Future research should examine how other dimensions of complexity may impact negotiation.  For example, Traavik (2011) found the more parties involved at the bargaining table (two versus four), the lower the judgement accuracy in the negotiation.  Our results are consistent with this finding and suggest that increased complexity may also lower negotiators’ aspirations as more parties are added to a negotiation.
	Although the results of these studies indicate there may be potential costs associated with adding issues to a negotiation, it does not suggest that this is not sound advice.  Rather, it finds that adding more issues increases the complexity of a negotiation and that complexity comes with potential costs.  Future research should examine whether potential the benefits of adding issues to a negotiation are outweighed by the costs of complexity.
What we did not address is how to manage the motivational and cognitive disadvantages associated with complexity.  Given that complexity is associated with lower ambitions, and lower ambitions, in turn, are associated with lower outcomes, our results suggest it may be particularly important for negotiators to set high goals when facing a complex negotiation.  In negotiation, as in other areas, high goals are associated with high performance (Miles & Clenney, 2012; Neale & Bazerman, 1985; Zetik & Stuhlmacher, 2002) and may serve to safeguard negotiators.  In light of the cognitive consequence of complexity, perspective taking may also be important for negotiators (Davis, 1983).  Negotiators who are able to, “put themselves in the other sides’ shoes” (Fisher et al., 1991) do better both individually and as a pair (Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, & White, 2008) and are more likely to avoid impasse (Trotschel, Huffmeier, Loschelder, Schwartz, & Gollwitzer, 2011). Perspective taking may help negotiators gain more accurate insights into their partners’ priorities, particularly when there are a greater number of issues on the table, and reduce the costs of complexity.
Conclusion
Expanding the pie by adding issues may increase the potential for finding mutually beneficial trades in integrative negotiation. However, negotiators should be aware of the potential costs of increased complexity.  
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Table 1
Study 1: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations among the Study Variables
______________________________________________________________________________
		M	SD	1	2	3		
______________________________________________________________________________
1 Goals	                                          865	(275)	  			

2 Judgement Accuracy                3219         (1112)	-.14*	  

3 Outcomes	                                  763		(171)	.16**	-.36**
______________________________________________________________________________
Note.  n > 239. * p < .05 ** p < .01


Appendix A
Participants’ payoff schedules for three issue negotiation
Technology and Innovation Majors Representative Issue Chart (with profit points in parentheses)
	          # of sites	                  Assignment		Mix
______________________________________________________________________
	5	(800)	Journal          (400)	Mix E	(100)	
	7	(600)	Group Paper  (300)	Mix D	 (75)	
	9	(400)	Indiv paper	    (200)	Mix C	(50)	
	11	(200)	Presentation   (100)	Mix B	(25)	
	13	(0)	Analysis             (0)	Mix A	(0)	

Entrepreneurship Group Representative Issue Chart 	(with profit points in parentheses)PRIVATE 
	# of sites                     Assignment		Mix
______________________________________________________________________
	13	(100)	Analysis	       (400)	Mix A	 (800)	
	11	(75)	Presentation	  (300)	Mix B	 (600)	
	9	(50)	Indiv Paper 	  (200)	Mix C	 (400)	
	7	(25)	Group Paper	  (100)	Mix D	 (200)	
		       5	       (0)                     Journal 	       (0)		  Mix E     (0)



Appendix B
Participants’ payoff schedules for seven issue negotiation
Technology and Innovation Majors Representative Issue Chart (with profit points in parentheses)PRIVATE 
# of sites	Location	Assignment              Budget            Mix            Timing            Due date
_________________________________________________________________________________________________
5	(480)	Region 1 	(360)	Journal	(80)	$50	(100)	Mix E	(120)	8th wk	(140)	Last wk of class	(20)
7	(360)	Region 2	 (270)	Group paper	(60)	$75	(75)	Mix D	 (90)	9th wk	(105)	Last day of class	(15)
9	(240)	Region 3	 (180)	Indiv paper	(40)	$100	(50)	Mix C	(60)	10th wk	(70)	1st day exam wk	(10)
11	(120)	Region 4	(90)	Presentation	(20)	$125	(25)	Mix B	(30)	11th wk	 (35)	Mid exam wk	(5)
13	(0)	Region 5	(0)	Analysis	 (0)	$150	(0)	Mix A	(0)	12th wk	(0)	Late exam wk	(0)
Entrepreneurship Group Representative Issue Chart 	(with profit points in parentheses)PRIVATE 
# of sites	Location		Assignment		Budget		Mix			Timing			Due Date
_________________________________________________________________________________________________
13	(120)	Region 5	(20)	Analysis	(80)	$150	(100)	Mix A	 (480)	12th wk	(140)	Late exam wk 	(360)
11	(90)	Region 4	(15)	Presentation	(60)	$125	(75)	Mix B	 (360)	11th wk	(105)	Mid exam wk	(270)
9	(60)	Region 3	(10)	Indiv paper	(40)	$100	(50)	Mix C	 (240)	10th wk	(70)	1st day exam wk	(180)	
7	(30)	Region 2	(5)	Group paper	(20)	$75	(25)	Mix D	 (120)	9th wk	 (35)	Last day of class	(90)
5	(0)	Region 1	(0)	Journal	 (0)	$50	(0)	Mix E	(0)	8th wk	(0)	Last wk of class	(0)



Appendix C
Participant payoff schedule for three issue negotiation (with profit points in parentheses)
	             Daily Rate                     Move-in Date                  Length of Rental
______________________________________________________________________
	$50	(800)	June 29          (400)	21 days  	(100)	
	$60	(600)	June 30	          (300)	18 days  	  (75)	
	$70	(400)	July 1         	    (200)	14 days   	 (50)	
	$80	(200)	July 2             (100)	10 days    	(25)	
	$90	(0)	July 3                (0)	7 days       	(0)	

Participants’ payoff schedule for seven issue negotiation (with profit points in parentheses)
Daily Rate       Move-in     Length of Rental         Deposit          Cleaning Fee      Equipment           Pet Deposit                     

$50 	(480)	   June 29 	(360)    21 days  (80)         50%   (100)        5%  (120)	     All       	    (140)        $0       (20)
$60 	(360)	   June 30	 (270)	  18 days  (60)         60%	 (75)	      6%  (90)	     no jetskis  (105)       $50     (15)
$70 	(240)	   July 1	 (180)	  14 days  (40)         70%	 (50)	      7%  (60)	    + no boat     (70)      $100    (10)
$80 	(120)	   July 2	(90)	  10 days  (20)	         80%	 (25)	      8%  (30)	    + no rafts     (35)      $150     (5)
$90   	(0)	   July 3	(0)	   7 days     (0)	         90%	   (0)	       9%   (0)	     none              (0)     $200      (0)




